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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QU'.BTEBLY
STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND THRmATs UNDER A PLEA OF SELY
DEFENsE IN HOMICIDE CASEs.-Whether a defendant in a homi-
cide case will prevail on a plea of self-defense will depend upon
whether he was reasonably justified in believing from all the cir-
cumstances that he was in immediate danger of death or great
bodily harm at the hands of the deceased. Obviously, therefore,
self-defense is a subjective matter viewed from the standpoint of
the accused. This fact has important considerations for the law of
evidence. The known reputation of the deceased as a violent and
turbulent man would naturally shed light upon the mental atti-
tude of the prisoner towards the deceased when the homicide
occurred.1 At the outset it must be borne in mind that evidence
as to the bad character of the deceased for peace and quietness is
not admissible in homicide- cases, unless a plea of self-defense has
been interposed.2 The mere fact that one is known to have a vio-
lent, ferocious and bloodthirsty disposition does not justify imme-
diate resort to killing him; nor does it palliate the offense.8 A
common limitation upon the introduction of such evidence is that
other evidence shall be offered which seems to bring self-defense
fairly into issue.4
This idea has been crystallized in several states under what
text writers call the "overt act" doctrine which requires some act
of possible agression before the reputation evidence can be re-
ceived." Whether sufficient evidence has been admitted -to sup-
ply the preliminary overt act requirement is a question left to the
sound discretion of the trial court.6 Some courts hold that a
statement of the accused as to an overt act of deceased is not such
proof of the act as to constitute of itself a predicate for the ad-
mission of evidence of the dangerous character of the deceased.
7
Yet other courts say that such proof may be made by the testimony
of the accused standing alone.8 Naturally the next inquiry con-
cerns what traits of character can be proved. While the courts
I State v. Evans, 33 W. Va. 417, 10 S. E. 972 (1890). Wood v. State, 92 Ind.
269 (1883).
2 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 353, and note.
a Ibid.
' WiGMonE, EVIDENCE, § 246.
s Ibid. Earle o. People, 260 Ill. 494, 66 N. E. 32 (1902) ; Pritchett V. State,
22 Ala. 39, 58 Am. Dec. 250 (1853).
6 Games v. State 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 853 (1891); State v. Ford, 37 La. An. 443,
461 (1885).
7 Bond v. State, 21 Fla. 738 (1886).
S 3 L R. A. (N. S.), 356.
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have used various phrases, one author sums them up by saying
anything that would lead the deceased to make an unprovoked
agression.9 Evidence that the deceased was a violent, vindica-
tive, bloodthirsty and dangerous man is admissible, as well as
any other trait indicative of violence, belligerency, uncontrolled
passion and the like.'0
Regarding the mode of proving the bad character of the de-
ceased it may be said that the general reputation of the deceased
in the community where both reside is sufficient with nothing
more, and the accused will be preslimed to know this general rep-
utation. But evidence of specific acts is not admissible. Yet when
there is an issue as to whether defendant had reasonable ground
to fear imminent danger, he may testify as to specific instances of
violence on part of deceased coming under his own observation,
or within his own knowledge.
12
Thus far we have viewed communicated character as bearing
upon the reasonableness of the defendant's apprehension of vio-
lence. But the actual character of the deceased, althoagh unknown
to the defendant, is admissible in most jurisdictions for another
reason and under different circumstances. In the latter instance
an objective test is applied to determine whether or not deceased
was the probable aggressor in cases where that fact is not clear.' 3
*While there are seemingly a few cases that repudiate this latter
doctrine, investigation reveals that most of these are early decis-
ions in which both courts and counsel erroneously applied the sub-
jective test. For this reason a reputable authority says that the
courts of these states may yet recognize the doctrine that uncom-
municated character evidence will be admitted in cases involving
the question of aggression.14
A closely allied subject and one in which the underlying princi-
ples are practically the same is that of threats, both communicated
and uncomnunicated. Evidence of threats is clearly inadmissi-
ble in cases where there is no evidence of a hostile demonstration."
No man has a right to kill another simply because the latter has
made threats against him. "A hostile threat, even though made
by the most lawless person, when unaccompanied by a demon-
stration of force at time of rencounter will not justify nor miti-
0 WiG onE. EviDENCE, § 246 (b).20 3 L. R. A. (N. S.), 351, and note; King v. State, 65 Miss. 576, 5 So. 97 (1888).
u 13 L. R. A. 222, and cases cited.
2 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 372.
i 24 A. L. R. 1019; 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 102; 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 359; 11 Ann.
Cases, 230.wIGM ORE, EVIDENCE, § 63.
Wn2aTON, HOIDE, (2 ed.) § 694; Oder v. Commonwealth, S0 Ky. 32 (1882).
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gate a killing because it may be that the party making the threat
has relented, or abandoned his purpose, or his courage may have
failed, or the threat may .have been idle gasconade.'16 A hostile
threat made by deceased against the accused and communicated.
to him prior to the killing is admissible as bearing upon the ques-
tion of the prisoner's apparent imminent danger of death or bodily-
harm at the time of the killing.
While the status of uncommunicated threats has been subject
to fluctuations and contradictions in the decisions, the following
doctrines may now be regarded as well settled. First, uncom-
municated threats are not admissible to justify or mitigate a hom-
icide since they could have had no influence on the mental state
of prisoner at the time of the killing. 7 Secondly, such threats are
admissible to corroborate other evidence of communicated threats,
in so far as they tend to counteract any presumtion of fabrication
by the witness who gave the first testimony."' Lastly, in a case
where there is any doubt as to who was the aggressor, evidence of
uncommunicated threats is admissible insofar as it may tend to
show the animus of the deceased, and, in the absence of more direct
evidence, show who was the probable aggressor. 9
-M. H. M.
PERs Ns--MARRiAGE-A NULm ENT.-It may well be said that
society does not desire that the lives of two young people be ruined
because of one mistake. But on the other hand, society is vitally
interested in preserving the dignity and sacredness of the marital
relation. How can this be done if we permit people to be married
in a spirit of jest, or to avoid inconvenience or embarassment, and
then to have the status, for it is a status, dissolved at will? In a
recent West Virginia ease it appeared that at a party it was sug-
gested, in a spirt of jest, that a young woman and man be married.
It became rumored and appeared in the press that the parties were
to have been married but had failed to do so. The next afternoon
the parties met and the man asked the girl to marry him to save
further embarassment and business inconvenience. It was agreed.
that they would be married in form only and that an annulment
would be procured as soon as possible. A license was secured
and the ceremony was performed by a minister in due form.
1s People v. Scroggins, 37 Cal. 676 (1869).
27 Carrol v. State, 28 Ala. 28, 58 Am. Dec. 282 (1853).
19 Cornelius v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. 432 (1855) ; See, WHAnToN, HOaucio,
§ 695.
19 Little v. State, 65 Tenn. 893, (1873) ; Wiggins v. People, 93 U. S. 465 (1873).
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